or the French Whatever the reason might have been for including the right within the Bill of Rights, it was never discussed during the course of debate on the Sixth Amendment."-It is Radin's opinion that the guarantee was included because of dutiful translation of the common law into the Bill of Rights. 12 There is no evidence to the contrary. The obscure origin of the right, however, does not detract from its vitality, and lack of a public trial has often been the reason for upsetting trial court verdicts. 18 But why is the right necessary? The courts and the-commen-accidental on the grounds that trials were already necessarily public by the Constitutional provision for a jury in criminal cases. U.S. CoNsr. AMEND. V. However, unless we are to assume that the Bill of Rights is needlessly repetitiousi, the drafters must have had something mQre in mind than just the jury as far as trial publicity is concerned. See Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 110 (1949 5 This was because of the public scorn that would be heaped upon the perjurer 6 and, secondly, because of the possibility that the court room contained someone who could refute a lie, should one be told.' 7 Along the same lines, the presence of the community has been felt to have a healthy effect on the judge, the jury, and officers of the court, preventing any arbitrary action on their part.'
8 On a similar tack is the rationale that an unknown witness might be brought forward by publicity of the trial.' The second explanation of the right to a public trial-the public's righthas been divided into three parts. First, it has been said that the public has the right to observe the activities of the government, including the judicial (.1884 ) (Holmes, J. said in a tort action: "It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should act under the sense of public responsibility and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.") ; 1 Cooley, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 441 (7th Ed. 1903) ("The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see that he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly con- While a public trial may well be said to improve the quality of testimony by reducing, to some extent, the tendency of a witness to lie, it is also true that spectators in the court room may have an adverse effect on the testimony. Thus the public's presence has often forced witnesses into frightened or embarrassed silence. The witness has been known to refuse to testify before the uncleared court from fear of personal harm. 28 Occasionally, in statutory rape cases the embarrassed prosecutrix will not testify at all unless the court room is cleared.
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While it can hardly be doubted that the presence of the public usually has a beneficial effect on the judicial process, it would be surprising if, on the other hand, the judge, the jury, and the officers of the court were not influenced by a common, strong prejudice of the courtroom spectators. Cheers, applause, and other demonstrations of approval or disapproval have often prejudiced defendants' rights.
25 Even unexpressed spectator hostility to the defendant has been the basis of reversible error when the, mob has come into dose contact with the jury. 28 It is apparent that the public's presence sometimes actually prevents the just administration of the law. . the whole case is a mask-that counsel, jury, and judge were.swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, and that.the State Courts failed to correct the wrong . . .") ; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1914) (Murder which inflamed the vicinity. Raucous conduct and cheering during the trial; cheering while the jury was polled. The Court said, "W'e, of course, agree that if a trial is in fact dominated by a mob so that the jury is intimidated and the trial judge yields, and so there is an actual interference with the course of justice, there is, in that court, a departure from due process of law in the proper sense of the term.")'; Taylor v. State, 55 Ariz. 29, 97 P. 2d 927 (1940) The many recognized exceptions to the right to a public trial conflict with the explanation of the right in terms of the unknown witness. The under-age spectator can be excluded by the judge in cases involving salacious testimony;27 yet there can be no assurance that the excluded minor cannot give pertinent evidence. Rowdies and hysterics may be excluded by the court for disturbing orderly trial procedures; 28 but cannot these same individuals be potential unknown witnesses? There can be no assurance that one who is excluded from the court room for any one of a number of valid reasons 29 does not possess vital testimony-yet it would seem that reviewing courts have never reversed a conviction because of such an exclusion from fear that the unknown witness had been prevented from testifying. Perhaps this is because the courts recognize the fact that the possibility of pertinent testimony, either in chief or rebuttal, coming from the courtroom audience is a meager one. 30 Adequate trial publicity can be and has been effected by the newspapers of the neighborhood, all of which can be represented by a few reporters.
It is difficult to understand how the defendant would be injured by clearing the courtroom if the right to a public trial belongs solely to the public. Can the defendant complain that the public has been foreclosed from exercising its right? He is certainly not injured because the public cannot watch as justice is being dispensed. Nor is he injured because similar defendants will not know how to plan their defenses. And he will undoubtedly receive the "... full educative value implicit . . . " in his own punishment without the help of the courtroom audience. It may be that the public's interest in the right to trial publicity can be stated in a different manner. It would seem that the public has an interest in maintaining a certain standard of fairness in the general administration of justice which can be separated from each defendant's right to a fair trial. One way of assuring this standard of fairness may be by permitting the public to attend criminal trials. But (conceding for the moment that it is solely a public right) whether its importance warrants crowded to capacity with every foot of standing room occupied. Conviction under these circumstances reversed.) ; State v. Weldon, 91 S.C. 29, 74 S.E. 43 (1912) At]. 642, 646 (1925) (Audience persisted in laughing and disturbing the orderly court processes. The reviewing court said, ". . . the publicity of the proceedings should be subordinated to the orderly and proper manner in which they are to be conducted; and, where the defendant is not prejudiced, nor deprived .of the.presence, aid, or counsel of any person 'whose presence might be of advantage to him, it is within the discretion of the court to exclude a part of the audience from the courtroom, where it deems it necessary so to do in order to secure the administration of justice and facilitate the orderly and proper conduct of the trial."). [Vol. 41 enforcement at the expense of allowing a defendant to invoke a right in which he has no interest to overturn an otherwise valid judgment is an open question.
Public trials, as we have seen, are sometimes prejudicial to the defendant, almost never bring forth pertinent testimony from the unknown witness, and may be largely a right of the public which should not be invoked by the defendant. These factors, of course, do not demonstrate that the right of public trial is never of substantial importance ta the defendant. They do suggest, however, that the right should not be applied in rigid and inflexible terms, but rather in such a way as to advance the interests of the public and the defendant in the particular circumstances of each case.
The public has an interest in keeping what it considers the impressionable segment of the population insulated from salacious testimony.
8 ' On review, the only question will be, was the exclusion only so wide as to protect that portion of the population. The public also has an interest in the orderly administration of justice.
8 2 To that end hysterics and rowdies may be removed from the court room and the defendant will not be heard to complain unless the exclusion was broader than necessary. In a large number of jurisdictions, the factors of a speedy and orderly trial are regarded as so outweighing the defendant's right to a public trial as to completely eliminate the necessity for considering the breadth of the exclusion.
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The only consideration relevaift in such a jurisdiction is whether there was any kind of public trial.
The circumstances of a case may be such that the defendant's interest cannot be protected unless the public is-barred from the court room. He is entitled to a fair trial and if this fairness can be achieved only through the exclusion of all or part of the spectators, the right to a public trial must be suspended in order to meet the requirements of due process. Today's judicial administration has two features which, to some degree, alleviate the necessity for trial publicity-an adequate record of trial court proceedings and appellate facilities for correcting errors below. Any abuses clear enough to be obvious to the court room audience are not likely to escape the reviewing court. Further, it would seem that today's trial judge is more influenced, in reaching a proper decision by the immediate approval or disapproval of the reviewing court than by the supposed public interest in such a judgment.
It must therefore be granted that the public's presence is not the only factor in preventing arbitrary judicial action. But we cannot conclude from this that the right to a public trial is'valueless. It would be impossible to estimate the worth of the influence wielded by the public on the jury, the officers of the court, and even the review-minded judge. It would be foolhardy-because its worth is inestimable-to suggest that the right is without substance. 
